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SECURED FINANCING'S UNEASY PLACE IN
BANKRUPTCY: CLAIMS FOR INTEREST IN
CHAPTER 11
Paula A. Franzese*
Bankruptcy has always been the ultimate measure of a creditor's security. In this era of rising bankruptcy filings,' questions sur* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; A.B., Barnard College 1980, J.D,, Columbia Law School 1983. The author wishes to thank Darin Pinto for his
invaluable research assistance.
1. Statistics compiled by Dun & Bradstreet Corporation indicate that there were more
than 61,000 business failures in 1987. THE DUN & BRADSTREET CORP., BUSINESS FAILURE

RECORD 4 (1988). The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts calculated that there were
62,534 business bankruptcy filings in 1989. R. Mecham, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS 27 (1989). Significantly, business debt
"is at a record level in relation to the nation's income." Robinson, America's Not-So-Troubling Debts and Deficits, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1989, at 50, 52. Further, of the more

than $300 billion in corporate debt attributable to leveraged takeover struggles, approximately
$150 billion is "junk bonds." Id. Studies report that at least 5% or 6% of these high-risk,
high-yield investment vehicles are likely defaults. Worthy, The Coming Defaults in Junk
Bonds, FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 1987, at 27; see also Myerson, Business Diary: More Bond Defaults, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1990, § 3, at 2, col. 4 (stating that "[t]he darkest forecasts of
corporate bond defaults soon come to seem far too optimistic."). The latest data reveals that
personal bankruptcy filings have nearly doubled since 1984, with creditors, such as bankers,
searching for ways to "stem the tide that costs them billions of dollars a year." Shoultz, Halting the Rush to Bankruptcy, Am. Banker, Aug. 24, 1989, at 6; see also Consumers' Debt
Rose $5.4 Billion in December, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at D2, col. 5 (tracing sharp rise in
consumer debt); Stout, Consumer Debt Jumped Sharply in November, Wall St. J., Jan. 10,
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rounding the secured creditor's prospects, if the debtor finds itself in

bankruptcy, have assumed increased relevance. At its core, the distributional aim of the secured transaction under state law 2 is to
subordinate competing claims in an effort to obtain full satisfaction
for prioritized creditors of privately contracted entitlements arising
from the promise to pay.3 This goal stands in stark contrast to fed-

eral bankruptcy law's egalitarian norms, with its attendant concerns
in the reorganization context, for the debtor's continued financial viability.4 The inherent potential for conflict between these two systems is compounded by textual ambiguities in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 5 and the relative sparsity of empirical exploration
of the traditional justifications
for bankruptcy's policies6 as well as
7
secured financing's missions.
Issues relevant to the treatment of the secured creditor's entitlement to interest accruing after the date of filing the bankruptcy petition (postpetition interest) offer a meaningful context in which to
explore these themes. In most instances, the parties' security agreement will provide for the debtor's payment of interest on outstanding
indebtedness at a fixed rate for the term of the contract. Often, the

contract will also entitle the creditor to payment and accrual of an
1989, at A2, col. 2 (reporting significant increases in total consumer borrowing); Luckett, Personal Bankruptcies, 74 FED. RESERVE BULL. 591 (1988) (examining considerable surge in
nonbusiness bankruptcies). See generally T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK. AS WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989) [hereinafter As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS] (citing empirical
findings of consumer bankruptcy).
2. This Article concerns consensual secured claims, which are liens recognized by state
law and created by agreement between the debtor and the creditor. These encumbrances include security interests in personalty and real estate mortgages. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9 (1978)
[hereinafter Article 9]; UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 7A U.L.A. 141 (1990). The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 includes these consensual liens in its definition of "security
interest." See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
3. See, e.g., WITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-1, at 1126 (3d ed.
1988) (explaining that "[tihe usual outcome in a priority conflict under the [Uniform Commercial] Code is that the winning party satisfies himself in full out of the collateral before the
subordinate party satisfies himself to any extent.").
4. See infra notes 20-24, 66-97 and accompanying text.
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2549 (codified as Title 11 of U.S.C. (1982)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code].
6. For a compelling compilation of empirical findings on consumer bankruptcy, see AS
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 1. The results of these findings are discusssed in an
ensuing article by Professor Boshkoff. See Boshkoff, As We Forgive Our Debtors In the Classroom, 65 IND. L.J. 65 (1989). Pioneering studies of personal bankruptcies can be found in
Schuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753 PersonalBankruptcy
Filings in Nine States, 88 CoM. L.J. 288 (1983); Schuchman, New Jersey Debtors 1982-83:
An Empirical Study, 15 SEToN HALL L. REv. 541 (1985).
7. See infra notes 51-81, 171-73 and accompanying text.
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increased interest rate in the event of the debtor's default.8 Outside
the bankruptcy context, state law generally renders such "default interest rate" provisions enforceable, unless the default rate constitutes
an impermissible penalty.9 When default is accompanied by bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, 10 however, the enforceability of
creditor claims to postpetition interest at an enhanced interest rate is
by no means plain.
As a general matter, bankruptcy law disallows postpetition interest on unsecured or undersecured claims, i.e., claims in which the
principal indebtedness exceeds the collateral's value." By contrast,
when a given claim is oversecured, i.e., whenever the collateral's
value exceeds the principal obligation, the creditor is entitled to
postpetition interest to the extent of the security's value., 2 The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not resolve the important question of the
allowable rate of interest that the oversecured creditor should be
awarded. 13 Moreover, it is unclear whether interest on oversecured
claims must be paid during the pendency of reorganization
4
proceedings.1
The enforcement in bankruptcy of default interest rates could
be deemed to vindicate the oversecured creditor reliance interests' 5
while preserving cognizable property and contract entitlements.',
The authenticity of presumed creditor expectations, however, is uncertain, and ultimately may yield to fact.' 7 Further, the labels "property" and "contract" do not provide an especially persuasive basis
8. See Cohen, Marwil & Gerard, Entitlement of Secured Creditors to Default Interest
Rates Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(b) and 1124, 45 Bus. LAw. 415 (1989).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBUG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1989) (providing that interest
cannot be usurious); CAL CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1989) (prohibiting unconscionable inter-

est rates); Citibank N.A. v. Nyland, 878 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 1989); In re United
Merchants & Mfrs., 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982).
10. For the primary chapter of the Bankruptcy Code pertaining to reorganization, see 11
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988). With few exceptions, it governs business reorganizations, enabling financially distressed entities to restructure their obligations and operations in order to
resume healthy functioning. By contrast, Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is for enterprises
that are beyond rehabilitation. It prescribes a schema for the liquidation of the beleaguered
entity, in order to satisfy claims of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 700-66 (1988).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988).
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
13. See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
14. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d) (1988). See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying
text.
15. See infra notes 36, 54-56, 169-77 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 40-43, 177-79 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 54-57, 169-70 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 1

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1

for distinguishing the entitlements of secured creditors from those of
unsecured creditors.1 s
More fundamentally, the disallowance of default interest rates
seems an appropriate vindication of legislative and public policies
when courts are presented with the prototypical debtor and creditor
that Congress envisioned when it promulgated the Bankruptcy
Code's provisions on reorganization.19 The debtor-protective measures contained in modern bankruptcy law seek to promote the successful rehabilitation of the business debtor who, although in the
throes of transient financial difficulties, represents a viable and productive business operation.2" The classic policy behind reorganization
is to give this valuable member of economic society another chance,
thereby preserving the jobs, products or services that financial stress
have placed in jeopardy.2 1 The traditional prototypical debtor, saddled with debts in hard times as a consequence of its providing a
legitimate product-line or service, should be shielded from the de22
structive effects that default penalty provisions are apt to impose.
Accordingly, the traditional prototypical oversecured creditor is presumed to be a financially stable entity who typically enjoys superior
bargaining power and leverage.2 3 This formidable actor should not
18. See infra notes 40-43, 177-80 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 66-81, 85-95 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the Court stated that "[b]y permitting reorganization, Congress
anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to
produce a return for its owners."); infra notes 76-81, 87-97 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5796 (emphasizing that "fair and equitable reorganization"
represents the "last clear chance" to conserve values "that corporate financial stress or insolvency have placed in jeopardy.") At a minimum, this is what Congress had in mind when it
promulgated the provisions on reorganization. Whether the legislative vision of bankruptcy as
a viable means toward successful debtor rehabilitation comports with present-day realities is
now a matter of some debate. See, e.g., Kashner, Majority Clauses and Non-Bankruptcy Corporate Reorganizations - Contractual and Statutory Alternatives, 44 BUs. LAW. 123, 123
(1988) (observing that "[g]enerally accepted financial and legal wisdom now says that a financially troubled corporation that needs to restructure its debt is better off in terms of costs and
expenditure of time doing so outside of bankruptcy."); Bankruptcy Can Be a Fate Worse Than
Liquidation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1990, at A24, col. 4 (city ed.).
22. See infra notes 87, 93-95 and accompanying text.
23. See generally White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal Property Security, 37
VAND. L. REv. 473, 475 (1984) (contending that "[s]ecured creditors tend to be well informed,
well represented, and powerful. Our traditional notions of fairness and concern for the underdog would suggest that the banks and other secured creditors should not receive better treatment than the general creditors."); S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted In
1978 US. CODE CONG. & ADimN. NEws at 5796 (stating that the vulnerable "debtor in distress" should be shielded in Chapter 11 from the "natural tendency" to pacify large
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be hindered unduly by virtue of the denial of an entitlement incidental to repayment of the principal obligation. 24 Thus, postdefault interest seems theoretically akin to a "windfall" to be reaped at the
expense of the goals of reorganization.
When the relevant players comport with these models, the allowance of claims for postpetition interest at an increased rate implicates concerns for the very integrity of the reorganization process
25
and the socially desirable ends that debtor recovery tends to serve.
Permitting certain creditors to reap gains triggered by bankruptcy
26
when there are few resources available to satisfy other claimants
and to revive the debtor frustrates successful reorganization while
providing potent disincentives to the troubled entity's even seeking
rehabilitation. If the financially distressed enterprise were obliged
to honor post-default entitlements during the Chapter 11 proceeding,
the continuing financial burden could force a liquidation. If interest
payments were forestalled during reorganization but permitted to accrue unpaid, an onerous burden would be added to the dead weight
of claims to be settled under any ultimate plan of recovery.
The statutory gaps that characterize this area have been filled
by recent judicial interpretations that boldly attempt to allay some
of these concerns. 28 The decisions, which broadly deny awards of
postpetition interest through resort to the Bankruptcy Code's curative provisions, are appropriate as well as prudent in view of their
respective facts, when the given debtor and oversecured creditor
comport with the congressional prototypes. The rulings are troublesome, however, insofar as they rest on the unstated and untested assumption that all lenders and debtors will fit the traditional models.
Recent financing arrangements belie this presumption, and remind
us that in certain instances the customary roles of debtor and creditor may well be reversed.29 Moreover, newly prominent and intricate
creditors.).
24. See generally In re South Village, 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (determining that secured creditor protections must be limited to preserve bankruptcy's essential function; keeping businesses in operation).
25.
26.

See infra notes 74-81, 85-95 and accompanying text.
See generally Kennedy, Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 15

INn. L. Rav. 477, 477 (1982) (asserting that "[t]o the extent a secured creditor obtains protection against the necessity of sharing in the losses suffered by other creditors of an insolvent
debtor, he frustrates a fundamental bankruptcy objective.").
27. See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
28.

See infra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.

29. Intricate corporate financing arrangements involving significant debt encumbrance
find the formidable business conglomerate in the role of debtor, with the relatively small start-
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corporate business transactions, such as the leveraged buyout3 0 involve the encumbrance of significant debt by the acquired enterprise
in an attempt to amass personal fortunes for the investor group.31
The company typically is obliged then to shift its focus from the
manufacture and marketing of its product or service line to financial
up business in the role of creditor, extending a product line or service on credit. For example,
Claridge's Chocolates, a small enterprise founded by a sole entrepreneur in 1988, supplied on
credit forty percent of its product to department stores acquired by Campeau, Inc.. When
Campeau, Inc., the debtor, was rendered bankrupt as a consequence of its onerous leveraged
buyout undertaking (see infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text), it defaulted on its obligations to its creditor Claridge's Chocolates, causing significant hardship to this new venture. See
Adam Smith's Money World: Going Broke: The Infamous Chapter 11, (WNET television
broadcast, Feb. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Adam Smith's Money World] (transcript no. 619, at 5,
on file at Hofstra Law Review), wherein the founder of Claridge's Chocolates recounts:
We got hurt by the [Campeau bankruptcy]. We did receive bad checks. We did get
caught with bad receivables. But the biggest problem for us was the top line. We
were not able to ship orders we had in-house. And we had the product produced
....
We wanted to create a product, and now, with these particular problems,
you have Robert Campeau coming in, who in my opinion was hugely irresponsible
in what he did ....
So many people have been hurt.
Id. at 5-6.
30. Leveraged buyouts are defined as "acquisitions in which the purchase price is financed largely with the credit, cash flow and, directly or indirectly, the assets of the acquired
company." Dayan, Leveraged Buy-Outs, in PRAcrISING LAW INSTITUTE No. 370, GoING PRIVATE 1981 113, 115 (1981).
Leveraged buyouts bring about concentration of a corporation's ownership in
the hands of a few stockholders. This permits the stockholders to control the corporation with the incentive to operate it efficiently in order to realize the entire profit
for themselves. Such a joinder of control and ownership, however, is produced at
great cost to the corporation, which provides most of the funds used to purchase the
stock from the selling shareholders.
Queenan, The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L.
Rnv. 1, 1 (1989) (footnote omitted). The leveraged buyout has attained a prominent place in
modem-day financing arrangements. "Between 1979 and 1987 the annual number of LBOs of
public companies rose from 16 to 259. During that same time frame, the aggregate price paid
in those transactions increased from under $1 billion to over $35.6 billion." Id. at 3. See
Sterngold, Buyout Specialist Bids $20.3 Billion for RJR Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1988,
at Al, col. 6; Roberts, Macmillan Inc. Agrees to Buy-Out By KKR Valued at $2.36 Billion,
Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 1; Betting the Store: Campeau at Last Gets Federated
- Now Can He Make a Go of It?, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 6. See generally
Bratton, CorporateDebt Relationships:Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE
LJ. 92, 95 (contending that"[r]estructurings have pushed corporate debt-equity ratios to historic highs; levels of indebtedness formerly thought unacceptably risky have become routine.").
31. Traditionally, a business grows by providing a product or service zealously and efficiently. In contrast, leveraged buyout participants seek to amass personal fortunes through
expansion designed to accommodate enormous debt service. See generally Queenan, supra
note 30, at 3 (explaining that the leveraged buyout "offers tremendous profit incentives to all
involved ....
Additionally, these transactions generate huge fees for investment bankers,
which explains why they have been such a force in initiating as well as financing [leveraged
buyouts].").
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measures designed to generate the cash necessary to reduce the

debt.32 When the ravaged entity is left insolvent 3 as a consequence
of its attempt to achieve concentration of its ownership in the hands
of the select few investor-stockholders, there is the danger of signifi-

cant prejudice to the company's non-stockholder constituency, including those creditors whose financing had sustained the now-compromised product or service line.34 In such settings, the federal
policies that would otherwise condone a pro-debtor bias are noticeably absent, insofar as the debtor's trouble is of its own making due
to imprudent overborrowing. 5 In contrast, then, to the blanket nullification of postpetition awards, equitable balancing would afford the
flexibility necessary to accommodate both the traditional corporate
debtor and creditor as well as the recent over-leveraged patterns of
financing which arguably call into question the policies based on the
32. See Kleinfield, How CuisinartLost Its Edge, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 46; Wayne, Can Harcourt Brace Survive Its Debt?, N.Y. Times, April 15, 1990, §
3, at 1, col. 2; Stertz & Smith, FruehaufPlans to Restructure to Ease Debt, Wall St. J., Dec.
22, 1988, at A4, col. 1; Betting the Store: Campeau at Last Gets Federated- Now Can He
Make a Go of It?, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 6; Waldman & Freeman, Burlington
Industries'Denim Plant Sale CatapultsOld Rival to Near Top of Field, Wall St. J., Nov. 9,
1987, at A7, col. 3; McCoy, Harcourt Brace Attempts to Sell Magazine Unit, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 20, 1987, at A2, col. 2.
33. As long ago as 1984, it was prophesied that "the more leveraged takeovers and
buyouts today, the more bankruptcies tomorrow." Who's Got the Leverage?, Wall St. J., June
21, 1984, at A34, col. 1 (statement of John S. Shad, former Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission). Recent events substantiate this prediction. See, e.g., Adam Smith's
Money World, supra note 29 (recounting, inter alia, Campeau, Inc.'s January 15, 1990 filing
for Chapter I1 protection); Lohr, Bonwit's Owner Filesfor Bankruptcy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1989, at Dl, col. 3; Roberts, Cuisinartsis Planning to Seek Protection of Bankruptcy Court,
ChairmanSays, Wall St. J., July 31, 1989, at A7A, col. 1; Stricharchuk, Revco, Taken Private with Junk Bonds, Files for Protection Under Chapter 11, Wall St. J., July 29, 1988, at
A2, col. 2; Smith & Anders, Leveraged Buy-Outs That Appear Shaky Are on the Increase,
Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1988, at Al, col. 6; Potts, Many Firms Pushed to the Brink, Boston
Globe, Jan. 25, 1987, at 94, col. 1.
34. See White, KKR Asks Seaman Furniture'sBanks, Bondholders to Make Major
Concessions, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1989, at A13, col. 1; Deep in Debt, Campeau Sees His
Retail Empire Beginning to Slip Away, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Cohen &
Williams, Companies Provide Illustrationsof Problems in Buy-Out Business, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 6, 1987, at A6, col. 2.
35. Adam Smith's Money World, supra note 29, at 4.
In other eras, companies sought the protection of the bankruptcy law because
of bad business decisions or turns in business that left them unable to pay their bills.
But in the 1990's, the major cause of bankruptcy is likely to be the level of debt. In
the past 10 years, corporate debt has risen from $1.3 trillion to $2.8 trillion, an alltime high. Much of that debt is in the form of high-yield, or junk, bonds issued for
takeovers and LBO's in the roaring 80's. Some of the buyers and some of the bond
dealers became rich, but not all of that debt will be paid.
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accustomed debtor-creditor relationship.
A critical assessment of the relevant case law, in light of pertinent theoretical and historical antecedents, suggests a frame of inquiry relevant whenever bankruptcy's collectivization goals are asked
to honor the self-interests of secured creditors seeking to enforce entitlements established before (as well as independently) of bankruptcy. Recent judicial pronouncements accommodate the traditional
paradigm described above, which gave rise to congressional debtorprotective policies. However, debt financing typical of the 1980's real
estate, retail and other corporate industries calls into question universal application of judicial solutions designed to oblige traditional
pro-debtor concerns.
I.

A.

THEORETICAL ANTECEDENTS

The Functions of Security

The fundamental distinguishing feature of a secured transaction
is the creditor's entitlement to rely on identified collateral for satisfaction of all or part of the outstanding indebtedness in the event of
the debtor's default.3 8 Frequently, secured debt takes the form of a
consensual lien on the debtor's personalty, pursuant to Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code,37 or realty, in accordance with applicable state law. 8 These consensual encumbrances often are accompanied by a host of privately bargained-for creditor entitlements
in the event of the debtor's default or bankruptcy. 9
It is well established that secured creditors' contractual and
state property rights are protected by the Constitution's due process 40 and just compensation 41 clauses. This recognition, however,
36. Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Models of
Fairness,68 MINN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1983) (explaining that the nature of the secured creditor's
entitlement is affected by the character of the collateral and ratio of the collateral's value to
the size of the outstanding obligation).
37. Article 9 supra note 2.
38. See generally R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 434-35 (1989) (discussing security interests in real property).
39. For example, as enumerated in the parties' contract, the consequences of default
routinely include acceleration of the principal unpaid indebtedness. See R. DUNCAN & W.
LYONS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS: WORKING WITH ARTICLE 9,

§ 5.01(3) (1987).

40. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579
(1934) (holding that contractual rights are protected by the fifth amendment); Sinking-Fund
Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1879) (stating that persons cannot be deprived of property without due process of law).
41. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors'Rights
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does not by itself provide a compelling framework for distinguishing
the entitlements of secured creditors from those of unsecured creditors. 2 State debtor-creditor law suggests that unsecured creditors
also have legally cognizable property interests in the debtor's assets,
although such interests reside in the whole of the debtor's qualifying
property, as opposed to any one or more identified bodies of
collateral.4
Essentially, theorists and academicians have posited that security functions as a risk-allocating device' as well as an efficient
means to decrease the total cost of credit. 45 Article 9, now enacted in
every state,4 6 replaced the bewildering myriad of common law perin Reorganization:A Study of the RelationshipBetween the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973, 974 (1983).
42. Even more fundamentally, it has been posited as a matter of corporate law theory
that "[h]istorically, contract has had an equal, or more often subordinate, position in corporate
legal theory - a position closely grounded in and responsive to economic practice." Bratton,
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectivesfrom History, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1473 (1989); see also Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds,
1984 Wis. L. REv. 667, 684 (observing, in context of examination of judicial regulation of
issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest, that "[c]ourts no longer confine themselves to classical
assumptions about contract relations.").

43.

See

UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE

AcT § 1, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1985); Clark, The

Duties of the CorporateDebtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 554-60 (1977) (explaining that state fraudulent conveyance law proscribes debtor misbehavior vis-a-vis all creditors). For a detailed analysis of secured and unsecured creditors' constitutional rights see Rogers, supra note 41, at 991 (concluding that "[r]eliance on the labels 'property' and 'contract'
hardly suffices to explain the supposed distinction between the constitutional rights of
secured and unsecured creditors.").
44. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88
YALE LJ. 1143 (1979); Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions,41 RUTERS L.
REV. 1067, 1072 & n.14 (1989); White, supra note 23.
45. Leading expositions on efficiency justifications for secured lending can be found in
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 44, at 1147-61 (exploring various monitoring considerations);
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-14 (1981) (critiqueing Jackson and Kronman); Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 55-57 (1982) (positing that
security functions to promote monitoring while minimizing free-rider problems); White, supra
note 23, at 491-502 (explaining secured financing as cost-reducing response to creditors' risk
aversion); Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 105566 (1984) (critiqueing Levmore and White); Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 916-33 (1986) (maintaining that secured transactions, viewed as
relational contracts, serve monitoring goals); Buckley, The Bankruptcy PriorityPuzzle, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1393, 1451-70 (1986) (justifying secured debt restrictions as a response to certain
screening efficiencies); cf. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U.
MIAmi L. REV. 577 (1989) (exploring efficiency arguments in context of conflict between
postpetition interest entitlements and bankruptcy law's "adequate protection" standard.).
46. By legislative enactment effective January 1, 1990, Louisiana became the last state
to adopt Article 9. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9 (West Supp. 1990).
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sonal property security devices by streamlining rules for the creation,
priority and enforcement of consensual security interests in personalty. The official comments to section 9-101 note that "[ihe aim of
this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which
the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions
' 47 Simican go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.
larly, the Uniform Land Security Interest Act48 represents a comprehensive scheme to govern all consensual security interests in real estate. 49 The statute endeavors to provide a cohesive framework in
which the "variety of financing secured by real estate can go forward
with greater certainty and less transaction cost." 5 0
Concerns of efficiency and risk allocation aside, as a general
matter security is often perceived as "a hedge against bankruptcy
and other manifestations of the debtor's insolvency." 5 1 For instance,
the Article 9 priority rules allow a debtor "to make a private contract with one creditor that demotes the claims of other creditors
from an initial position of parity to one of subordination. 52 Indeed,
one of the primary reasons for collateralizing in accordance with the
statute's requirements is to protect this creditor against the world of
potentially competing claimants in the event of the debtor's default.
"Priority is the purpose of security; and the secured creditor seeks to
53
subordinate, not to share."
It is unclear, however, whether secured creditors collateralize
with the actual expectation that their bargained-for entitlements
will, for the most part, be honored when default is accompanied by
bankruptcy. 54 While those vested with special non-bankruptcy law
entitlements, such as Article 9 claimants, often fare best in the
bankruptcy process, 55 it has been aptly observed that "there are no
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

U.C.C. § 9-101 (1987).
UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT §§ 101-604, 7A U.L.A. 146-88 (1990).
Id. at 141; see R. POWELL, supra note 38, at 1 435.1.
UNIF. LAND SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 7A U.L.A. 143 (1990).
Keinedy, supra note 26.
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 44, at 1147; see also B. CLARK, THE LAW OF
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.02[3] (2d ed. 1988)
(noting that "[t]he position of the secured party with a properly perfected security interest is

an exalted one.").
53. R. DUNCAN & W. LYONS, supra note 39, at § 4.01[1]; see also WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 3, § 24-1, at 1126 (stating that a prioritized creditor is entitled to full satisfaction
before subordinate party takes).
54. See infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.

55. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857 (1982). Professor Jackson, noting that the principal concerns of bankruptcy are creditor-distribution questions, observed that "[t]he claimants who fare best in the
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winners in bankruptcy, only survivors." 58 Ultimately, more needs to
be learned about the secured creditor's bona fide expectations, and
empirical exploration of authentic creditor experience (and, attendantly, secured financing's justifiable purposes), is an important
and worthwhile source of study. Bankruptcy law's distributional
scheme cannot honor expectations or purposes that remain
uncharted.
B.

The Origins of Bankruptcy Law

In a crucial respect, the aims of modern bankruptcy law differ
considerably from those reflected in its Roman and English law antecedents. While contemporary doctrine reveals substantial concern for
the debtor,57 bankruptcy has its origins as a device intended solely to
facilitate creditors' collection abilities, without regard for the
debtor's future well-being or the societal interests to be served by

successful debtor rehabilitation.

8

Initially, for example, discharge

was not permitted and debtors remained liable to any creditors not

paid in full at the conclusion of the asset distribution process.5 9 Indeed, bankrupts were deemed the perpetrators of fraud, and were
bankruptcy process hold special entitlements under applicable non-bankruptcy law." Id. at
858. Jackson offers a normative thesis aimed at justifying "the time-honored proposition that
non-bankruptcy entitlements, such as security interests, should be recognized in bankruptcy."
Id. He proposes that bankruptcy be viewed "as a system designed to mirror the agreement one
would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate such an
agreement .... " Id. at 860.
56. R. DUNCAN & W. LYONS, supra note 39, at § 7.01.
57. See infra notes 66-78, 87-96, 182-93 and accompanying text.
58.

See generally D. BAIRD

& T. JACKSON, CASES.

PROBLEMS AND

MATERIALS ON

BANKRUPTCY 27-28 (1985) (noting that "[e]arly bankruptcy laws did not help or protect unlucky debtors; they gave creditors of merchants another method of collecting debts in addition
to those they already had."); Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern
Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 190-94 (1938) (discussing early statutes' absence of
debtor-protective measures).
59. Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 16-18
(1919). The first English bankruptcy statute, enacted in 1542, prescribed a collective collection
system but did not permit discharge. See An Act Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankcrupt, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, ch. 4, § 6 (1542). English bankruptcy law first sanctioned discharge by
Act of Parliament dated 1705. See An Act to Prevent Frauds Frequently Committed By
Bankcrupts, 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 7 (1705). This entitlement, however, "came largely to reward
cooperation rather than to assist the unlucky [debtor] . . . . The discharge in bankruptcy
• . . began as only one half of a procedural device that enabled creditors to gather more
information about a debtor's assets." D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 28. See
generally Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the
Early Modern Period, 69 TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL Soc'Y 5 (1979) (exploring development of
discharge in English law).
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subject to punitive sanctions including imprisonment.6 0 The very
term "bankruptcy" (literally translated from the Latin "banca
rupta," or "broken bench") is derived from the Roman custom of
physically breaking the debtor's workbench once his assets were collected and distributed.6" This practice served as a punishment as well
as a warning to other indebted tradesmen. 2
Significantly, however, the early bankruptcy laws prescribed an
enduring collective remedy for aggrieved creditors.
Although an individual creditor did not lose the right to sue
the merchant debtor at some later time (because there was no discharge), each creditor had to share the debtor's existing assets with
every other creditor. Essential elements of these early English
bankruptcy statutes, then, were the sequestration of the merchant's
assets and the imposition of restraint on creditors, to ensure that a
creditor did not seek repayment in full at the expense of other
6
creditors. 3
All creditors would share in the delinquent debtor's assets on a pro
rata basis.64 This collective mode of redress afforded many creditors
a means of reaching their debtor's assets, where previously none had
existed. Nonetheless, "cases could arise in which an individual creditor fared worse under the bankruptcy statute. A creditor who might
have been able to recover in full if left to pursue individual remedies
would have to share whatever the debtor had with all the other
creditors." 65
The development of bankruptcy law in the United States reflects a significantly greater concern for the debtor's recovery.66 The
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,67 the first comprehensive statutory compilation, 68 ."expanded bankruptcy from a remedy that was imposed by
60. See Cohen, The History of Imprisonmentfor Debt and its Relation to the Development of Dischargein Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIST. 153 (1982); Treiman, Escapingthe Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. Rav. 230 (1927); Levinthal, supra note 59, at 1.
61. See Levinthal, supra note 59, at 2 (noting the etymology of the word "bankrupt").
62. Luckett, supra note 1, at 592.
63. D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 28.
64. Levinthal, supra note 59, at 15.
65. D. BAiRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 58, at 28.
66. See generally Labaton, Bankruptcy Bar: Never So Solvent, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,

1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 59 (positing that "the American system favors debtors more than
any other system in the world.").
67.
1978).
68.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter 1898 Act] (repealed
The first bankruptcy law enacted in the United States dates back to 1800, and was

repealed three years later. Like its English predecessors, the Act of 1800 existed to assist
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creditors to one that could be voluntarily sought by debtors."0 9
Among other debtor-protective measures, the 1898 Act entitled the
debtor to a discharge of outstanding obligations in exchange for the
liquidation of the debtor's non-exempt assets.70 "Thus, at the close of
the 19th century, a body of law originally designed to serve creditors
' 71
took on a significant aspect of debtor protection."
Subsequent amendments, most notably the Chandler Act of
1938,72 prescribed a comprehensive and accessible framework for
debtor reorganization.73 The Bankruptcy Code continued to liberalize bankruptcy practice and procedure so as to permit equitable
balancing of the interests of creditors and debtors, while facilitating
the aims of debtor recovery. 74 Most significantly, the provisions on
business reorganization prescribe procedures designed to protect
creditors While promoting the successful rehabilitation of the financially troubled debtor. 5 Indeed, the principal aim of Chapter 11 is
to encourage the cooperative participation of all interested parties in
order to rescue those entities which, although fiscally distressed, have
a viable future.76 "[N]o longer should a worthy 'patient' succumb to
creditors in the collection and distribution of the defaulting debtor's assets. A. COHEN & L.
FORMAN, BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9 AND CREDITORS' REMEDIES 439 (1989). Equally shortlived bankruptcy statutes were enacted in 1841 and in 1867. Id.
69. Luckett, supra note 1, at 592.
70. The 1898 Act permitted state legislatures to prescribe categories of debtor assets
that would be exempt from creditors' reach. See Luckett, supra note 1, at 592-93.
71. Id. at 593.
72. Chandler Act, ch. 575, §§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 840, 883-905 (1938) (codified in part in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
73. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, concerned with liquidation of the bankrupt estate, did
not provide for debtor reorganization. See 1898 Act, supra note 67.
74. The Bankruptcy Code became effective on October 1, 1979. It consolidated its predecessor's various chapters on reorganization, and introduced provisions intended to expedite
implementation of the given plan for debtor recovery. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1124, 1129
(1988) (permitting plan confirmation notwithstanding objections of claimants deemed
"unimpaired"); infra notes 139-40. With respect to personal bankruptcy, the statute introduced enhanced debtor-protective measures, such as the expansion of the categories of assets
deemed exempt from liquidation. See Luckett, supra note 1, at 593. Overall, the Bankruptcy
Code gives significant discretionary latitude to bankruptcy judges, so as to afford the flexibility
necessary to accommodate inevitably competing interests while vindicating fundamental fairness. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (enabling the bankruptcy court to "issue any order,
process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
75. The Bankruptcy Code defines "debtor" as a "person" eligible for bankruptcy relief.
11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988). "Person," in turn, is defined to include any individual, partnership or
corporation. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988).
76. See, e.g., Lawrie, Dealingwith the Financially Troubled Corporation, 1989 BANKING L.J. 515, 516. Robert Lawrie stated:
[N]ow, with the 1978 Code, there was clarity and hope of a successful rehabilitation. Indeed, a number of practitioners rank the benefit to debtors very high on
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the cost of the financial rehabilitation operation."" To this end, the
debtor is to be shielded from postbankruptcy harassment by creditors
seeking to enforce special entitlements destined to compromise resort
to, as well as attainment of, reorganization goals. 8
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code, like the 1898 Act, preserves bankruptcy's essential historical function as a collective mechanism aimed
at distribution on an egalitarian basis.7 9 This egalitarian norm,

firmly rooted since the very origins of bankruptcy law, 80 coupled
with the Chapter 11 concerns for debtor recovery,"' portend conflict
whenever a secured claimant seeks to carry out self-interested expectancies during bankruptcy proceedings.
C. Secured Financing's Uneasy Coexistence with Bankruptcy's
Normative Goals
As a general matter, federal bankruptcy law recognizes and permits the enforcement, subject to limitation, of secured liens.8 2 In a
seminal pronouncement on the impact of the 1898 Act upon secured
the scale of improvements effected by the Code ....
Although not always so effected, the Code's primary chapter 11 objective is to encourage debtors and creditors to a consensual reorganization in an effort to rescue those financially challenged
enterprises that have a commercial future.
Id. (citations omitted).
77. Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code,
34 Bus. LAW. 1309-10 (1979), reprinted in 1980 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 165, 167.
78. See, e.g., Nimmer & Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: FiduciaryDuties,
Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 70 (1989):
Prior to the initiation of the Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor's defenses are
often exhausted, leaving the debtor vulnerable to creditor dominance. Chapter 11
alleviates this circumstance by providing a protective cloak which neutralizes creditor pressure. The filing of Chapter 11 provides the debtor with a sanctuary, affording it an opportunity to restructure its business and deal more effectively with its
debts.
Id.; see also H. MILLER & M.L. COOK, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
(1979) (noting the Bankruptcy Code's concern for protecting debtors from postbankruptcy
harassment and discrimination by creditors.); S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5796 (stating that a "vulnerable" debtor
should be shielded from the likely dominance of "large creditors").
79. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) (asserting
that bankruptcy's aim is "equality of distribution"); H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
71 (1973) (reporting that bankruptcy law functions to distribute debtor's assets on equitable,
egalitarian basis); B. CLARK, supra note 52, § 6.01, at 6-3 (examining bankruptcy legislation's
endeavor to achieve equity among competing creditors).
80. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
82. See II U.S.C. § 506 (1988) (noting that U.S. bankruptcy law recognizes the necessary role of secured credit by permitting limited enforcement of secured creditors' rights); see
also Kennedy, supra note 26, at 478.
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creditors' rights, the Supreme Court noted that "the federal bankruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that
the [secured creditor] is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the
same protections he would have under state law if no bankruptcy
had ensued." 8' 3 In the context of deferring to applicable state laws
that supported a secured creditor's claims to rents that accrued postbankruptcy on realty serving as collateral, the Court continued:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because
an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal
courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage
forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.'8 4
Similarly, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code85 reveals an
intent to attune bankruptcy law to the practices and benefits of a
modern credit economy, of which a vital feature is the secured financing arrangement.8 6
Notwithstanding this somewhat vague resolve, modern bankruptcy law remains grounded in the firmly established policies of affording the debtor a financial reprieve or fresh start, 7 rehabilitating
83. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56 (1979).
84. Id. at 55 (citation omitted); see Weg, The Secured Creditor'sRights to Rents from
Real Property, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 29 (1988).
85. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
Title 11 of U.S.C. (1982)).
86. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6295 (stating that the Code should "be brought into harmony"
with the growth of consumer and commercial credit and with the "nearly universal" adoption
of the U.C.C. and that "[s]ecured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit of their
bargain."); H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5971 (maintaining that"[b]ankruptcy is mainly a procedural device, prescribing the method of accomplishing rehabilitation or liquidation, but generally leaving undisturbed legal relationships that existed before bankruptcy."). But see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 180, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEws 6141 (noting that
Congress intended "significant changes from current law in ... the treatment of secured creditors and secured claims."). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988) (containing text and history
of section 506 which, as part of 1978 revisions, governs definition and treatment of secured
claims); Note, Compensation for Time Value as Part of Adequate Protection During The
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 305, 312 (1983) (authored by Thomas 0.
Kelly III).
87. See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934), where the Court
noted that bankruptcy law serves primarily to provide honest debtors an avenue to rid themselves of obligations incurred as a consequence of business misfortunes. The Court continued:
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the troubled enterprise,88 and achieving egalitarian distribution
among claimants. 89 In reorganization proceedings,9" the financially
distressed entity is restructured "to enable it to operate successfully
in the future . . . .By permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy
creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners." 1 The rehabilitation process "presupposes dynamic rather than static uses of
property and denouement in a plan which accommodates the many,
not just the few."' 92 Reorganization is intended to afford the debtor a
meaningful opportunity to regroup, shielding it from "preferential
systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of assets." 93
To facilitate these ends, bankruptcy endeavors to restrain creditors from advancing their individual interests to the detriment of
"[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act [of 1898] is to [afford debtors] . . .a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt." Id. at 244. See generally Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. RaV. 1393, 1439-47 (1985) (proposing a normative theory of debtor discharge); Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States:
The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427, 428-30 (1974) (reciting the history and
applications of the fresh start policy); Note, Protection of a Debtor's "FreshStart" Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 39 CATH.U.L. REv. 843, 846 (1990) (authored by Richard S. Davis)
(exploring the fresh start imperative in the context of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). Confirmation of a plan of reorganization entitles the debtor to a discharge of prior debts. 11
U.S.C. § 1141 (d)(1) (1988). "This discharge is effective as against any creditor, regardless of
whether or not ...the creditor has accepted the plan." B. WEINTRAUB & A. REsNcK, BANKRUPcy LAW MANUAL § 8.24, at 8-119 (1986); see infra note 139 and accompanying text
(discussing plan confirmation).

88. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. Naws 5796 (discussing the economic importance of reorganization); In re

South Village, 25 Bankr. 987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (reconfirming bankruptcy's principal
objective as keeping businesses in operation); Harris v. Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 317
U.S. 447, 451 (1943) (stating that bankruptcy affords opportunity for debtor rehabilitation
while leaving creditors "all for which they may reasonably hope.").
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
90. The policies of debtor rehabilitation, debt discharge and egalitarian distribution are
viable in both the reorganization setting as well as in the liquidation context. See supra notes
66-79 and accompanying text. In liquidation proceedings, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to afford
the debtor a financial fresh start while prescribing an egalitarian schema for distributing assets
among claimants. See T. JACKSON,THn

LoGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 4 (1986);

Jackson, supra note 87, at 1396.
91. United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983).
92. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
93. Id. The court continued: "[reorganization] encourages rehabilitation: debtors may
seek its asylum while recovery is possible rather than coasting to the point of no return; creditors, realizing that foreclosure is useless, may rechannel energies toward more therapeutic
ends." Id.
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other claimants and the debtor's recovery.9 4 Indeed, of greatest relevance to the immediate context is the Bankruptcy Code's overriding
normative goal of enabling "the owners of assets to use those assets
in a way that is most productive to them as a group in the face of
incentives by individual owners to maximize their own positions."9 5
This objective stands in stark contrast to the aims of state debtorcreditor law, such as Article 9, intended to permit holders of prioritized secured claims to advance their own interests at the expense of
subordinate competing claims.9 6
When bankruptcy's collectivization goal is asked to oblige the
self-interests and alleged expectations of secured creditors, who may
be seeking to enforce entitlements established before bankruptcy, the
potential for conflict is manifest.9 7 The treatment of secured creditors' claims for postpetition interest presents an important setting in
which to examine secured financing's precarious coexistence with
bankruptcy imperatives.
II.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS: POSTPETITION INTEREST

A.

Statutory and Case Law Underpinnings

The 1898 Act did not address the issue of creditor entitlement
to postpetition interest.98 In an effort to facilitate the aims of reorganization, case law filled the legislative void by denying accrual or
payment of postpetition interest on unsecured debt.9 9 As the Supreme Court observed, "[t]o allow a secured creditor interest where
his security was worth less than the value of his debt was thought to
be inequitable to unsecured creditors."100 The courts permitted application and accrual of interest on secured debt, but only to the
extent that the collateral was sufficient to pay such interest.101 The
traditional justification for allowing postpetition interest on over94.

See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (1984).

95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. See supra notes 2-3, 51-53 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 2-5, 79-81 and accompanying text.
98.

Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations in Reorganization Under the

Bankruptcy Code, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 436 (1983).
99. See, e.g., Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911) (denying postpetition interest deemed a "fundamental principle" firmly entrenched in 150 years of English law and practice); American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266-68
(1914) (viewing interest as a form of penalty that should not accrue).
100. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164 (1946).
101. See, e.g., In re Inland Gas Corp., 241 F.2d 374, 379-81 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 838 (1957); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 9.08 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
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secured consensual liens is articulated in United States v. Harrington,102 where the Fourth Circuit noted that when the given collateral
is intended to secure both the principal of the debt and interest until
payment, and when the security is sufficient to do so, the contract
between the parties should not be abrogated by bankruptcy. 03
The equitable principle applied in assessing prebankruptcy Code
claims for postpetition interest is found in Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green. 04 There, the Supreme Court found it
"manifest that the touchstone of each decision on allowance of interest in bankruptcy, receivership and reorganization has been a balance of equities between creditor and creditor or between creditors
and the debtor." 05 Vanston is significant insofar as the case urges
that the propriety of postpetition interest be determined, not on rigid
adherance to any bright-line rules, but rather on the overall aims of
reorganization, as well as the equities presented by the particular
10 6

controversy.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured claims, including the
undersecured portion of a partially secured claim, are not entitled to
postpetition interest in bankruptcy.10 7 By contrast, the holder of an
oversecured claim 10° may recover postpetition interest to the extent
of the excess collateral value.108 Specifically, Bankruptcy Code sec102. United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1959).
103. Id. In Harrington,the court refused to allow post-bankruptcy interest on a nonconsensual tax lien. Id. at 726.
104. 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
105. Id. at 165.
106. Id. at 156; see O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Postpetition Interest in Chapter
II Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. LJ. 251, 259 (1982) (noting that the impact of the Vanston
case encourages the examination of "postpetition interest not under the mandates of rigid
rules, but in the light of the purposes of bankruptcy reorganization in general and the facts of
each case in particular.").
107. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988). See generally Schorer, The Right of the Undersecured Creditor to PostpetitionInterest in Bankruptcy on the Value of Its Collateral:Implications of Recent Cases, 21 U.C.C. L.J. 61 (1988). In United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that in a Chapter 11
reorganization, an undersecured creditor is not entitled to interest on its collateral as compensation for the delay occasioned by the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay in foreclosing on
collateral. Id. at 382. The Supreme Court in Timbers was not concerned with oversecured
creditors, who, as noted, are allowed awards of interest to the extent of the collateral's value.
Id. at 372.
108. As noted, an oversecured claim is one in which the collateral's value exceeds the
amount of principal indebtedness. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988). See generally B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK,
supra note 87, § 5.11 [3], at 5-56 (examining entitlements to postpetition interest and concluding that "[w]henever the value of the collateral, after the deducting of expenses that may be
recovered from the property, exceeds the amount of the allowed claim, the claimant is entitled
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tion 506(b) entitles the secured creditor to interest accruing after the
petition date to "the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured
by property the value of which . . . is greater than the amount of

such claim."11 In no event, however, may the oversecured creditor's
claim for interest exceed the excess value of the collateral."' Recently, in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,Inc.,' 2 a majority
of the Supreme Court determined that section 506(b) entitles a creditor to receive postpetition interest even on a nonconsensual oversecured claim. 1 3
Moreover, interest on oversecured claims may have to be paid
currently to the secured creditor who resorts successfully to the "adequate protection" relief afforded by the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions."14 The filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays all creditor collection proceedings against the debtor or
property of the estate."15 However, section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code affords relief from the stay "for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection of an interest in property." While "adequate protection" is not defined in the legislation, section 361(3) provides that adequate protection, when required, may be provided by
granting relief designed to afford a creditor "the indubitable
equivalent" of the creditor's interest in property. This standard, read
in conjunction with section 506(b), suggests that the oversecured
creditor may be entitled to current payment of postpetition interest
allowed under the parties' security agreement. Further, even if it is
not paid to the secured creditor currently during the reorganization,116 secured interest permitted under section 506(b) accrues durto an allowable claim
110.

. . .

to the extent of the excess collateral value.").

11 U.S.C § 506(b) (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, "[s]ince this provision

permits postpetition interest to be paid only out of the security cushion, the undersecured creditor, who has no such cushion, falls within the general rule disallowing postpetition interest."

Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372-73.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
112.

489 U.S. 235 (1989).

113. Id. at 237.
114. See generally Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizationsand the Treatment of

Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. RPv. 97 (1984) (discussing the adequate protection standard).

115. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
116. Current payments of interest might not be mandatory if the collateral is not diminishing in value during the reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988); United Say. Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1988). Nonetheless, it has become
commonplace for enterprises in reorganization to pay interest currently to fully secured creditors, so as to avoid any necessity of paying interest upon unpaid interest to such creditors
following reorganization.
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ing the pendency of the proceeding, adding to the weight of claims to
be dealt with under the execution of the plan.
It is unclear whether these allowances in bankruptcy represent a
particular deference to oversecured creditors' bargained-for entitlements. The legislative history of the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions is "wholly inconclusive. ' 117 The absence of statutory history is
unfortunate, as the Bankruptcy Code fails to resolve the rather important question of the allowable rate of interest to be awarded the
oversecured creditor. More specifically, is an oversecured creditor entitled to postpetition interest at a contracted-for higher default rate?
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether section 506 allows default rates of interest. Lower court decisions are by no means
uniform, with some cases emphatically permitting postpetition interest at enhanced default rates,118 and others rejecting such entitlements. 11 9 Courts allow default interest rates in bankruptcy partly on
the basis that privately negotiated entitlements should be honored1 20
and, to a greater extent, on the ground that section 506 does not
expressly authorize examination of the reasonableness of interest
rates charged by the secured creditor. 12 ' Neither assertion is especially persuasive, insofar as bankruptcy law has long tolerated, if not
squarely authorized, the modification or abrogation of privately bargained claims to accommodate the exigencies of insolvency or to facilitate the normative aims of bankruptcy. 22 Moreover, the very
ability to allow postpetition interest has its roots in an equitable balancing of fact-specific considerations.12 3 Indeed, nothing on the face
of section 506 prohibits judicial weighing of the salient and competing interests in view of the purposes to be served by reorganization
and the more general policies underlying both bankruptcy and com117.

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 254 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting) (quoting Best Repair Co., Inc. v. United States, 789 F.2d 1080, 1082 (4th Cir.
1986)).
118. See, e.g., In re Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. 500 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (allowing
creditor to collect at enhanced default rates according to an agreed upon predefault contract);
In re W.S. Sheppley & Co., 45 Bankr. 473 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (recognizing an enhanced default rate as legitimate because a defaulting mortgagor is a substantial risk); see
also In re 268 Ltd., 789 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting in dicta that application of section
506 to claims for interest is not circumscribed by a reasonableness standard).
119. In re White, 88 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); In re W.S. Sheppley & Co.,
62 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).

120. See, e.g., Skyler Ridge, 80 Bankr. at 511 (finding that, absent usury or unconscionabilility, privately contracted default interest rates should stand).
121.
122.

Id.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 547 (1988).

123. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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mercial law.
Significantly, resort to such inquiry does not compel the denial
of the default interest rate in every case.124 In fact, the decisions to
engage in a balancing of the equities have reached divergent conclusions about the enforceability in bankruptcy of the particular interest
entitlement at stake. 125 Equitable balancing affords flexibility, permitting judicial vindication of authentic creditor reliance interests
12
when warranted.
Ultimately, when confronted with the claim for postpetition interest at an enhanced rate, courts should weigh the secured creditor's
status and reasonable expectation interests against applicable concerns for the debtor's recovery and the integrity of the reorganization process.12 7 These competing considerations are presented, yet
not explicitly balanced, in recent judicial pronouncements which
deny the application and accrual of postdefault interest under the
curative provisions of Bankruptcy Code section 1124.128
Bankruptcy Code section 1124(2) provides that a debtor seeking
to confirm a plan of reorganization can reverse (or "deaccelerate") a
contractual debt acceleration and reinstate the original maturity
date by "curing" the default that prompted the acceleration. 12 To
124. See In re Maimone, 41 Bankr. 974, 979 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (stating that the
policies of the Bankruptcy Code and commercial law "do not forcefully compel either the
contract rate of interest, a market rate, the legal rate, or any other particular interest rate.").
125. See, e.g., In re Planvest Equity Income Partners IV, 94 Bankr. 644, 645 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1988) (denying default interest rate, but awarding contract rate based on application of
standard of reasonableness); In re W.S. Sheppley & Co., 62 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1986) (disallowing postdefault interest rate upon resort to multi-factored inquiry, including
fact that lender was partially responsible for allegedly injurious delay in plan confirmation);
Maimone, 41 Bankr. at 974 (allowing postpetition interest at contract rate upon consideration
of Bankruptcy Code policies and commercial law's aims); see also In re 360 Inns, Ltd., 76
Bankr. 573 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (denying default interest rate even though debtor was
solvent, based upon equitable principles).
126. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 19-35 and accompanying text (positing that recent financing arrangements resulting in bankruptcy tend not to comport with the congressional prototype of
the economically distressed business debtor seeking reprieve).
128. In re Southeast Co., 868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Entz-White Lumber &
Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). See generally In re Forest Hills Assocs., 40
Bankr. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that estate was required to pay only lower
predefault rate where mortgage note provided that in the event of default and acceleration,
higher interest would be imposed); In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 43 Bankr. 293 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd in part, affid in part, 60 Bankr. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (construing section 1124(2) as completely nullifying claim for default rate of interest on accelerated balance
of outstanding indebtedness).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1988); Cohen, Marwil & Gerard, supra note 8, at 424-25;
see infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
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construe this provision, courts have determined that "U]ust as the
debtor need not pay the postdefault accelerated debt, he need not
pay the postdefault interest rate on the accelerated debt."1 30 The
Ninth Circuit ventures further and, in a bold and recent departure,
has ruled that this "deacceleration" provision also permits the
nonaccelerated debtor to continue to pay interest at the predefault
rate, regardless of a contractual provision entitling the creditor to a
higher postdefault interest rate independent of the note's maturity.,,"
The court's decisions also declare that even interest accruing
13 2
postdefault, but prebankruptcy, is disallowed at the higher rate.
The propriety and wisdom of this approach will be explored in the
materials that follow.
B.

Judicial "Cure-all"

Pursuant to a plan of reorganization, the debtor may be af33
forded the opportunity to "cure" the effects of a given default.
"Cure" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.13 ' However, in the
context of passing upon the entitlement of Chapter 13 debtors to
'"cure defaults," the Second Circuit in In re Taddeo13a issued an oftcited pronouncement with respect to the meaning of "cure" as that
term is used throughout the Bankruptcy Code:
[T]he power to cure must comprehend the power to 'de-accelerate.' This follows from the concept of 'curing a default.' A default is an event in the debtor-creditor relationship which triggers
certain consequences-here, acceleration. Curing a default commonly means taking care of the triggering event and returning to
pre-default conditions. The consequences are thus nullified. This is
the concept of 'cure' used throughout the Bankruptcy Code. 1s6
Later, the court concluded that "'curing a default' in Chapter 11
130. In re Southeast Co., 81 Bankr. 587, 591 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987), affd, 868 F.2d
335 (9th Cir. 1989). See generally Cohen, Marwil & Gerard, supra note 8, at 425 (stating
that "[t]he impact of this section [1124(2)] is to moot entirely the claim for a default rate of
interest on the accelerated balance.").
131. In re Southeast Co., 868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Entz-White Lumber &
Supply, 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
132. Southeast, 868 F.2d at 339; Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1342.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(G) (1988).
134. See generally Epling, ContractualCure in Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR U. 71, 7273 (1987) (noting that Bankruptcy Code's cure provisions "are vague and general, leaving to
the courts the discretion to impose equitable cure on a case-by-case basis.")
135. 685 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1982).
136. Id. at 26-27.
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means the same thing as it does in Chapters 7 or 13: the event of
default is remedied and the consequences are nullified," 137 notwithstanding any state laws to the contrary. 38
In Chapter 11, a plan of reorganization may be confirmed despite the dissent of a given class of creditors, as long as that class is
left "unimpaired" pursuant to section 1124.139 Section 1124(2)140
137. Id. at 29.
138. See In re Blackwelder Furniture Co., 31 Bankr. 878, 880 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983)
(deciding whether "the bundle of rights possessed or retained by the unimpaired creditor include[s] such rights as he possessed prior to the commencement of the case or only such rights
as he possessed at the instant of filing or immediately after the filing of the petition, as such
rights had been limited by the operation of § 552(a) and other sections of the Code.") The
court concluded that the creditor's "original position" referred to his prepetition position, and
not the position he might have occupied after the intervention of the "temporary crisis" of
bankruptcy. Id. at 881.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1988). Section 1124 is the Chapter 11 provision on impairment. A plan of reorganization must specify the classes of claims that are not impaired by the
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(2) (1988). As a general matter, the plan may be confirmed without
the consent of those classes deemed unimpaired. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(B) (1988). By contrast, confirmation of the plan depends on its acceptance by the impaired classes of creditors,
unless the court sanctions the plan notwithstanding rejection by an impaired group. Id. This
alternative method of plan confirmation is commonly denoted the "cram-down" because it
empowers the court to confirm a plan over the objection of an impaired class of creditors. On
satisfying a number of stringent prerequisites, "the plan may be crammed down nonassenting
classes as long as there is at least one assenting class." B. WEINrAtB & A. RESNICK, supra

note 87, § 8.23 [1], at 8-102. For a discussion of the history and impact of bankruptcy's cramdown powers see Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement
Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW. 441 (1984).
Pursuant to section 1124(2), deceleration accompanied by cure does not impair the secured creditor's rights. Thus, the plan may be confirmed over that creditor's objections. In In
re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982), the Second Circuit explained: "Having defined impairment in the broadest possible terms, Congress carved out a small exception to impairment in
§ 1124(2) providing that curing a default, even though it inevitably changes a contractual
acceleration clause, does not thereby 'impair' a creditor's claim." Id. at 28-29. See generally
In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 418 (7th Cir. 1984) (allowing confirmation of
reorganization plan which cured default despite creditor's dissent); H. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963; Comment,
Impairment, 3 BANKR. DaV. J. 579 (1986) (authored by Joseph M. Gaynor, Jr.).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). This section provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in section 1123(a)(4) of this title, a class of claims or interests is
impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such class,
the plan
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles
the holder of such claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest after the occurrence of a default (A) cures any such default, other than a default of a kind specified in
section 365(b)(2)of this title, that occurred before or after the commencement of the case under this title;
(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity
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provides that notwithstanding the given creditor's contractual entitlement to accelerate the debt as a consequence of default, the reorganization plan may restore the original maturity date and obligations.14 1 The creditor will be deemed "unimpaired," provided that
the debtor "cures" any default that existed before the commencement of the bankruptcy case.1 42 The deacceleration principle is intended to vindicate the notion that "the advent of the bankruptcy
process is not a proper occasion for the assertion of greater (or different) rights than existed against the debtor, under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, the moment before bankruptcy. 1 43 As the Supreme Court asserted in Butner v. United States,4 4 one should not
reap a windfall "merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy." 4
When confronted with section 1124(2), secured creditors who
had bargained for higher postdefault interest rates have argued that,
as a condition of cure, the debtor must pay interest at the
postdefault rate. 4 Additionally, creditors have asserted that the
statute's curative measure pertains only to obligations that had been
accelerated as a consequence of default, and not to loans that had
matured "naturally."' 47 The Ninth Circuit has rejected both of these
contentions.1 48
In In re Southeast Co.,' 49 the debtor and creditor entered into a
mortgage that permitted, in the event of default, an increased interest rate that would apply independent of any acceleration of the
debt. 15 0 After default and the filing of a petition for reorganization,
existed before such default;
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any damages
incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such
contractual provision or such applicable law; and
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights
to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or
interest.
Id.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
& Supply,
147.
148.
149.
150.

11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(B) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)(A) (1988).
Jackson, supra note 55, at 879.
440 U.S. 48 (1979).
Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
See In re Southeast Co., 868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Entz-White Lumber
Inc., 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
Southeast, 868 F.2d at 335; Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1338.
Southeast, 868 F.2d at 335; Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1335.
Southeast, 868 F.2d at 335.
Id. at 336.
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the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of the higher postdefault rate of
interest to the oversecured creditor.1 5 ' The court ruled that the cure
of default can include the avoidance of 1a52default interest rate that is
activated even without an acceleration.
The creditor argued that because the debtor's duty to pay the
postdefault interest rate was not a consequence of acceleration, that
duty could not be eliminated by a section 1124(2) cure. The court
responded:
[T]he consequences of default for purposes of cure are not
limited to acceleration. Section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
'authorizes a plan to nullify all consequences of default, including
avoidance of default penalties such as higher interest.' Plans to
cure defaults under section 1124(2) are not limited to those deto nullifaults resulting in acceleration. Nor are such plans limited
53
default.
a
of
component
acceleration
the
only
fying
Thus, in the court's view, reinstatement of the original maturity
date under section 1124(2) also permits the debtor to continue to
pay interest at the predefault rate, notwithstanding the creditor's
contention that it had bargained for a higher postdefault interest
rate, independent of the note's maturity. The creditor would not be
deemed impaired,' 5 4 "so long as the reorganization plan returned the
creditor to its original position.' 55 As the legislative history of section 1124 states:
The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a
temporary crisis which the plan of reorganization is intended to
clear away. The holder of a claim or interest who under the plan is
restored to his original position, when others receive less or get
nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain. 58
Since this creditor had been restored to its initial position, the court
reasoned, it could not complain of the denial of its claim for interest
151. Id. at 337.
152. Id; see In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982). In this regard, Taddeo offers
some support for the court's ruling. There, in the context of ruling that the Chapter 13 entitle-

ment to cure is coterminous with the Chapter 11 allowance, the Second Circuit seemed to
endorse the contention that section 1124(2) "explicitly gave corporate debtors the power to
cure defaults without regard to acceleration." Id. at 28.
153. Southeast, 868 F.2d at 338 (citation omitted).
154. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
155. Southeast, 868 F.2d at 338.
156. Id. (citing S. REP.No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5906).
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at the postdefault rate.
The Ninth Circuit's determination seems motivated in large
measure by concerns for the underlying aims of reorganization and,
most particularly, the facilitation of successful debtor rehabilitation.
Section 1124's curative provision is properly construed as:
.provid[ing] the debtor in distress with the statutory tools necessary
to effect a total healing of the scars of contractual default, by placing the parties into the same position they were in immediately
before the default occurred. This healing is accomplished by paying
the creditor whatever monies he would257 have received under the
contract, had the debtor not defaulted.
Significantly, the Southeast Co. court also rejected the creditor's contentions that its right to have the default rate applied to
accrued postpetition interest is an allowed oversecured claim under
section 506(b) and that its right to have the enhanced rate applied to
accrued prepetition interest is an allowed claim under section
502(b). 1 58 The former contention is governed by another, even
bolder, Ninth Circuit ruling, In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply,
Inc., where the court applied section 1124(2) to deny an oversecured
creditor its entitlement to a postdefault higher interest rate even
though the note's maturity had never accelerated . 59 In Entz-White,
the court ruled that section 1124 may be applied retroactively to
cure a default arising from a matured prepetition obligation, thereby
nullifying all consequences of default, including a postmaturity default rate. 6 0°
In determining prepetition interest, the court in Southeast Co.
held that Bankruptcy Code section 502(b) provides no express mechanism for awarding prepetition interest at the postdefault rate provided for in the security contract.1 61 Entz-White would apply by
analogy, insofar as there had been a cure under section 1124(2). "To
allow prepetition interest at the postdefault rate would eliminate the
benefits of cure in this [context]," by precluding nullification of an
16 2
important result of default.
In Entz-White, the debtor defaulted on a promissory note of ap157. In re Southeast Co., 81 Bankr. 587, 591 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (quoting In re
Forest Hills Assocs., 40 Bankr. 410, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).

158. In re Southeast Co., 868 F.2d 335, 338-39 (9th Cir. 1989).
159. In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1335, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1988).

160. Id. at 1340-42.
161. Southeast, 868 F.2d at 339.
162. Id.
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proximately three million dollars owed to the creditor bank. 163 The
parties' agreement stipulated that, in the event of default, the governing interest rate would increase to a minimum of eighteen percent
per year. 164 The debtor did not pay the outstanding obligation when
due and, shortly thereafter, filed a Chapter 11 petition.16 5 In accordance with the court-confirmed plan of reorganization, the debtor
was entitled to cure the default owed the creditor by paying it the
full amount of its principal claim, together with accrued interest at
the nondefault rate.166 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy
court's denial of the creditor's claim for default interest, ruling that
the curative benefits of section 1124(2) extended beyond those defaults resulting in acceleration.16 7 Thus, notwithstanding the fact
that the note had matured "naturally," the debtor could cure this
default, thereby nullifying all of the default's adverse consequences,
including the higher interest rate. 68 By construing section 1124(2)
so as to permit a debtor to avoid the payment of default interest on a
matured obligation, the Ninth Circuit redefined the bounds of creditor as well as debtor entitlements.
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTINUED VIABILITY OF
REORGANIZATION

The Entz- White rationale, as reaffirmed in Southeast Co.,
surely reveals the extent to which courts will endeavor to defeat default interest when confronted with the paradigmatic debtor and
creditor. 6 ' Moreover, these pronouncements transcend their respective facts. For instance, within the scope of the rulings, demand obligations as well should not be entitled to a default rate of interest so
long as the debtor can fully repay the debt in cash at confirmation. 170 At least theoretically, the decisions transform (and not
merely postpone) lienholders' contractual rights once bankruptcy is
163.

Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1339.

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1342. Since the debtor was repaying the creditor's claim in full, it has been
posited that the court should have framed the relevant statutory issue as whether section
1124(3) permits awards of default interest. Klausner, Pachulski & Godshall, Chapter 11 - The
Bank of Last Resort, 45 Bus. LAw. 261, 268 (1989).
168. Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1342.

169. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text (discussing congressional debtorcreditor models sustaining reorganization's debtor-protective policies).
170.

Cohen, Marwil & Gerard, supra note 8, at 426.
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declared. Hence, for the debtor and general creditors, bankruptcy
becomes perhaps a more attractive means of dealing with secured
creditors' claims, an implication which will be explored.
It may be posited that these recent decisions, by defeating the
intended impact of default interest clauses, thwart creditors' expectations. Secured creditors, as such, may collateralize with the expectation, grounded possibly in a host of private property and contract
rights,"' that their bargained-for entitlements will, for the most
part, be upheld in bankruptcy. 72 This contention is less than convincing, however, insofar as doubts about the legitimacy of any
averred expectations persist.
At a minimum, secured parties' reliance interests may not be so
firmly rooted as their adherents would assert. As a general matter,
bankruptcy law has never treated secured creditors well. 73a Ever
since Article 9 was promulgated, commentators have predicted the
abridgement or displacement of various secured lender entitlements
in favor of the debtor's rights in bankruptcy.17 4 Indeed, the whole of
bankruptcy legislation has been evolving toward greater restrictions
171. As discussed, the property rights rationale as a basis for affording secured creditors' special treatment is by no means dispositive. State debtor-creditor law suggests that unsecured creditors also enjoy legally protected interests in the debtor's assets, residing in the
whole of the debtor's qualifying property. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
172. See generally T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra
note 90, at 139 (stating that as a general matter, "bankruptcy law should respect the relative
value of entitlements fixed before the transition to bankruptcy because the common pool problem is unrelated to the allocation of the original entitlements."); Jackson, TranslatingAssets
and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1985) (arguing that Bankruptcy's collectivization goal "can be achieved only if the nonbankruptcy attributes of assets
and liabilities that affect ordering among claimants are precisely identified and translated,
with minimal dislocations, into the bankruptcy forum.").
173. See Schwartz, The ContinuingPuzzle of Secured Debt, supra note 45, at 1069; see
also Carlson, supranote 45, at 578 (claiming that "[b]ankruptcy trustees hate liens and would
like to destroy them."); Koch, Bankruptcy Planningfor the Secured Lender, 1982 BANKING
LJ.788, 816 (contending that bankruptcy is deemed "traumatic" for secured lenders).
174. See, e.g., Countryman, The Secured TransactionsArticle of the Commercial Code
and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 76 (1951) (examining
creditor-restrictive Chandler Act amendments to § 60 of Bankruptcy Act of 1898); Hanna,
The Secured Creditorin Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 471, 483 (1960) (exploring likely
"condemnation" in bankruptcy of after-acquired property clauses); Comment, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code - A Potential Policy Conflict With the FederalBankruptcy Act, 2
VILL. L. REV. 395, 405-06 (1957) (authored by Leo Kearney O'Drudy Jr.) (portending policy
conflict between Article 9's "freedom of contract" imperative and bankruptcy law's theme of
"'equality of distribution.' "); Note, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential Conflicts, 53 Nw. U.L. REv.411 (1958) (assessing bankruptcy's uneasy accommodation of
state security interests).
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on the secured creditor's rights against the debtor." 5 This readily
discernible trend is of particular relevancy to postpetition interest,
which bankruptcy law has long restricted.176
The well-established judicial and statutory predisposition towards disallowing most claims for postpetition interest, coupled with
the cumulative tendency towards curtailing secured creditors' entitlements in bankruptcy, may render any propounded secured creditor
reliance interests somewhat unpersuasive. Moreover, the state "property rights" rationale for affording secured creditors' favored treatment in bankruptcy is by no means dispositive. 17 State debtor-creditor lav itself suggests that unsecured creditors also have legally
cognizable property interests in the debtor's assets.178 Further, pursuant to the bankruptcy power, Congress can and has curtailed state
law property entitlements in the debtor-creditor setting, thereby impairing prospectively the rights of secured creditors.179
At bottom, it may well be that postpetition penalty clauses are
inserted with little expectation that they will enjoy the force of law.
In any event, the contention that the instant rulings frustrate secured
creditors' expectations or secured financing's aims may ultimately be
unavailing if for no other reason than the sorry fact that many of the
actual characteristics of security remain unknown.180
Still, the court's broad construction of section 1124 is somewhat
in tension with the meaning typically ascribed to the statute. For
instance, Collier1 8 ' posits that Congress, in enacting section 1124:
[Q]uite appropriately concluded that a person that receives the
benefits of its original bargain is not impaired even if the plan modifies such person's rights by preventing such person from using a
contractual or legal right of acceleration to terminate a valuable
contract of the debtor in circumstances where the debtor is willing
to cure past defaults and perform under the original terms of the
agreement.

82

175. See Jackson, supra note 55, at 901 (positing that bankruptcy law has "consistently
moved in the direction of refusing to recognize attempts by a state to elevate the claims of any
one type of claimant in bankruptcy through the device of either a state-created priority or a
statutory lien effective only in bankruptcy.").
176. As noted, only oversecured creditors are allowed to claim such interest. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See Jackson, supra note 94, at 736 n.29.
180. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
181. 5 COLLiER ON BANKRUPTCY 1124.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1989).
182. Id. at 1 1124.03[2] (emphasis added).
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The Ninth Circuit disregards the references to 183
"accelerated payment" in the statute and in its legislative history.
While grounded in strained, if not inventive, statutory interpretation, it may be that Entz-White, as bolstered by Southeast Co.,
simply carries the Bankruptcy Code's cure principle to its logical
end. When the consequences of default to be contended with pertain
to the allowability of default penalties such as higher interest, it
seems vital to the integrity of the reorganization process that the
opportunity to cure be permitted, no matter that the given obligation
had reached maturity absent actual acceleration. At a minimum,
then, section 1124 should be construed so as to permit the debtor the
opportunity to cure, independent of whether the default resulted in
acceleration. 8
Moreover, as concerns the prototypical debtor and creditor, 85 it
may well be that the power to cure under the Bankruptcy Code
should permit a plan to nullify all consequences of default, including
postpetition interest. Certainly, in the traditional reorganizational
setting, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation facilitates several compelling policies. As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, "the payment of postpetition interest is arguably somewhat in tension with
the desirability of paying all creditors as uniformly as practicable."188 Enforcing default interest rates in bankruptcy, thereby permitting the oversecured creditor to reap more than its predefault
rate of interest, is especially difficult to justify when there are few
resources available to repay all creditors and reorganize the
debtor.187 Significantly, the courts' rulings should help to prevent the
scope of secured creditor default penalty provisions from widening,
thereby discouraging creditor windfalls to be reaped at the expense
of the integrity of the reorganization process.
The Ninth Circuit's pronouncements promote bankruptcy's vital
function in providing an arena for determining collective rights and
183.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADmw. NEWS 5789, 5906 (explaining section 1124: "a claim or interest is
unimpaired by curing the effect of a default and reinstating the original terms of an obligation
when maturity was brought on or accelerated by the default.").
184. The relevant legislative history reveals that the Senate drafters of section 1124
were concerned with defaults resulting in acceleration. Id. However, the House Report ascribes
a broader interpretation to the statute. See H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 408, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6364 (noting that "[r]einstatement
consists of curing any default.").
185. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
186. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 245-46 (1989).
187. Cohen, Marwil & Gerard, supra note 8, at 427.
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liabilities - a function that is justifiable because it affords "protection
against the destructive effects of an individual remedies system when
there are not enough assets to go around." ' At bottom, "[a] fair
and equitable reorganization, as provided in [chapter 11], is literally
the last clear chance to conserve for [unsecured creditors and/or equity interests] values that corporate financial stress or insolvency
18 9
have placed in jeopardy.
Ultimately, allowing default interest rate provisions could undermine resort to, as well as the overall effectiveness of, Chapter I1
proceedings. 9 0 The importance and potential benefits of successful
reorganization are manifest. In contrast to liquidation, reorganization presents an opportunity for the continued productive use of the
debtor's business, 19 1 to the benefit of potentially countless workers
and the economy.1 9 2 The financially distressed enterprise should be
encouraged to seek the asylum offered by Chapter I1 while recovery
is possible, "rather than coasting to the point of no return.' 9 3 Creditors, in turn, realizing that foreclosure would be unavailing, might
"rechannel energies toward more therapeutic ends."1' 94
Significantly, the debtor's incentives and abilities to rehabilitate
could be destroyed if, in bankruptcy and beyond, creditors were permitted to fully exercise collection rights established before, as well as
T. JACKSON, supra note 90, at 20.
S. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 5796; see supra notes 72-78, 87-93 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Mallory & Phelan, To Impair or Not to Impair - That is the Question in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 869 (1986) (claiming that "[flor a
188.
189.

business debtor in the throes of financial difficulties, the most important statutory mechanism
for rehabilitation is found in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code."). But see supra note 21

and accompanying text (noting recent challenges to the congressional vision of bankruptcy as
the fundamental means toward debtor recovery).
191. See Blum, supra note 98, at 432 n.10; see also In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr.

987 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (perceiving aim of bankruptcy law as keeping businesses in operation); Anderson, Classification of Claims and Interests in Reorganization Cases Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 58 Am. BANKR. L.J. 99 (1984); Trost, Business Reorganizations Under
Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 1310 (1979); Coogan, Broude &
Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30
Bus. LAW. 1149 (1975); Note, supra note 86, at 315. As noted, there is some debate with

respect to whether this theoretical characterization comports with the realities of today's bankruptcy reorganization proceedings. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
192. See Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, supra note 45, at 1069
(setting forth the view that "reorganizations are thought to be desirable largely because they

save jobs and sometimes salvage something for small equity investors.").
193. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
194.

Id.
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independently of, bankruptcy. 19 5 Moreover, enforcing secured credi-

tors' entitlements to postdefault interest at increased rates would
drain the pool of assets to the detriment of lower priority claimants,
thereby dampening their incentives to participate supportively in the
reorganization and its aftermath.""' By contrast, the Ninth Circuit's
rulings tend to enhance the .preferability of Chapter 11 proceedings
for most creditors, who are apt to perceive the possibility of an in1 97
crease in the obtainable bundle of assets.
IV.

CONCLUSION

To the extent that the Ninth Circuit's determinations enhance
resort to a governmentally-monitored system of redistribution while
facilitating the equitable aims of that system, the decisions are justifiable. The potency of averred secured creditor reliance interests to
effect a contrary result is diluted in part by concerns as to the authenticity of the creditors' expectations and, ultimately, by the absence of compelling empirical data as to the precise nature of those
interests.
While sound in view of their respective facts, however, the
cases' insistence that postpetition interest be denied as a matter of
legislative imperative is neither plain from the statute nor appropriate in every setting. For instance, recent systems of debt encumbrance suggest that there may well be circumstances in which the
given equities favor awards of postpetition interest to oversecured
creditors. 98 Resort to equitable balancing, then, in the attempt to
discern what cure ought to mean in the given proceeding, should afford courts the flexibility necessary to accommodate emerging, untraditional contingencies while vindicating fundamental fairness.

195.

See generally Rogers, supra note 41, at 1005 n.123 (contending that "(s]addled

with debts, deprived of assets necessary for minimal comfort, and knowing that the fruits of
his endeavors will be taken by creditors, the debtor may simply forgo productive activity, and
economic society will lose a potentially productive member.").
196. As noted, the bankruptcy court is, of course, empowered in certain carefully delineated settings to confirm a given plan of reorganization over the objections of an impaired class
of creditors. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
197. See Jackson, supra note 55, at 864-65.
198. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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